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Tema: How should we judge the success of the EU’s enlargement policy? What can 
Spain expect to achieve in this field during its EU Presidency in 2010? 
 
 
Resumen: The EU’s ‘strategy for enlargement’ is essentially reactive: not driven by a 
grand design on the part of the existing members, but by pressure from countries wanting 
to join. The criteria for evaluating the success of the policy are two-fold: (1) for the period 
before membership they are similar to normal criteria for foreign policy; but (2) for the 
period after accession they are more complex, since each expansion affects the 
composition and identity of the EU itself. 
 
The last round in 2004 and 2007, when the EU grew from 15 to 27 members, was a 
considerable success on both sets of criteria. In the current round the EU is dealing with 
prospective members whose situation and prospects are very different: Turkey, the 
countries of the Western Balkans and Iceland. The phenomenon of ‘enlargement fatigue’ 
should not deter the EU from pursuing its expansion in a rational way. 
 
During its EU Presidency in the first half of 2010 Spain is not expected to achieve a major 
breakthrough in enlargement policy, but should ensure that steady progress is made in 
preparations for membership by the countries concerned. 
 
 
 
Análisis: For most of its lifetime the EU has been engaged in discussions with 
prospective members. With successive enlargements, the number of EU member states 
has quadrupled, its population has trebled and its official languages have increased from 
four to 23. This is a remarkable tribute to the magnetism of the European method of 
integration, and despite the problems which it has experienced in recent years over 
institutional and constitutional reforms, the EU remains attractive to outsiders. At present 
there are seven declared applicants for EU membership: Turkey (1987), Croatia (2003), 
Macedonia (2004), Montenegro (2008), Albania, Iceland and Serbia (2009). Others –
Bosnia and Kosovo– have the official prospect of membership, and several countries in 
Eastern Europe (such as the Ukraine) aspire to it. 
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What Strategy for Enlargement? 
Let us begin by qualifying the notion of ‘enlargement strategy’. Although the European 
Council mentions enlargement in the conclusions of practically all of its summit meetings 
and the European Commission produces a Strategy Paper on enlargement every year, 
the EU has no strategy for enlargement in the sense of a deliberate plan for future 
expansion. It has never invited other countries to join –in fact, it has often discouraged 
them from applying–. In this respect, the EU has always been reactive, rather than pro-
active, in its policy for enlargement: it has expanded under pressure from its neighbours, 
not through some kind of imperialist ambition. 
 
In 19th century America the expression ‘manifest destiny’ referred to the belief that the US 
was destined, even divinely ordained, to expand across the North American continent. 
European ideologues, even those who envisage the development of the United States of 
Europe, have rarely considered enlargement as the EU’s destiny: on the contrary, since 
‘widening’ is often perceived as an obstacle to ‘deepening’, enlargement is frequently 
viewed as a threat to the achievement of the EU’s aim of ‘ever-closer union’. 
 
What Criteria for Evaluation? 
So it would not be rational to evaluate the success of enlargement policy by reference to 
the number of countries joining, or by the speed of their accession. A more correct 
approach to evaluating the policy would be two-fold, consisting of a first group of criteria 
for the period before enlargement –the ‘pre-accession’ period– and a second group 
concerning the period after accession, when applicant countries have become members 
of the EU. 
 
The criteria for the pre-accession period are similar to those applying to foreign policy in 
general: one can consider enlargement policy successful if it enhances security, stability 
and prosperity both for the EU and for the countries concerned. But the more important 
test concerns the period after enlargement, and here one can consider that the criteria for 
a successful result include the harmonious integration of new members, without disruption 
of existing members or the functioning of the EU’s institutions and policies, and the 
satisfactory continuation of the EU’s development. 
 
This distinction between these criteria for evaluation –before and after accession– is 
useful and important: it shows, for example, that the common assertion that ‘enlargement 
is the EU’s most successful foreign policy’ is not correct. For the EU, enlargement policy 
is foreign policy only to a limited extent. Since each accession affects the EU’s identity by 
modifying its basic membership, it would be more appropriate to describe it as an 
‘existential’ policy. 
 
This also explains a number of key features of the enlargement process, such as the EU’s 
insistence on the acceptance by applicants of all the existing policies and rules (the 
acquis), and its introduction in 1993 of value-based pre-conditions for accession (the 
Copenhagen criteria). It is sometimes thought that these criteria are a manifestation of the 
EU’s ‘civilising mission’ to spread its standards to neighbouring countries: but in fact they 
were introduced not for altruistic reasons, but rather as a precaution to avoid accepting 
new members who might disrupt the EU’s functioning. 
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In the light of this approach to enlargement policy, let us try to evaluate its present 
situation and prospects. 
 
Results of the Last Enlargement 
The last round of enlargement, which brought in 12 new members in 2004 and 2007, was 
the most important expansion ever in terms of the number of new member states –though 
it should not be forgotten that from the point of view of the increase in the EU’s population 
and economy it was less important in relative terms than the enlargement of 1973–. 
Judged by the criteria defined above, there is no doubt that the last enlargement was a 
real success: in the pre-accession period it saw the peaceful transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe from the Communist model to democracy and a mixed economy. 
Furthermore, the post-accession experience has been largely positive for the EU: the new 
member states integrated rapidly into the system, the institutions have functioned as well 
(or as badly) as they did when there were 15 members and the EU’s policies have 
continued to develop. 
 
To put it another way, expansion did not result in paralysis of the decision-making system, 
as some predicted; the new partners have proved difficult on some issues, but they have 
not been more obstreperous than the old members. In particular, it was not the new 
members who killed the Constitutional Treaty and delayed the Lisbon Treaty, but France, 
the Netherlands and Ireland whose peoples said ‘no’ in referendums. Although 
dissatisfaction with EU enlargement is sometimes cited as a reason for the results of 
those referendums, it was certainly not a main reason, as can be seen from the results of 
surveys conducted at the time. 
 
Meanwhile, the forecast, common in the 1990s, that the inclusion of the Central and East 
European countries would increase the tendency for ‘differentiated integration’ or ‘variable 
geometry’ has not proved correct. Rather, the contrary has been the case: most new 
members have joined the Schengen area, some have already joined the euro zone, and 
the other new members –unlike certain old members– wish to join the euro despite (or 
perhaps, because of) the present macroeconomic problems. 
 
The last round of enlargement was not, however, a success on every front. The accession 
of Cyprus without the hoped-for reconciliation between its Greek and Turkish communities 
was a disappointment; it brought into the EU a divided island, with too much of the 
attention of the government in Nicosia devoted to one issue, and the Cyprus dispute adds 
to the difficulties of Turkey’s efforts to join the EU. Another failure of the last enlargement 
was the premature accession of Bulgaria and Romania with insufficient preparation: 
having such low standards of governance in the fields of justice and corruption, they 
create problems as member states not only for themselves but for the EU as a whole. 
 
Prospects for Future Enlargement 
Let us now look at the prospects for progress on enlargement duding Spain’s six-month 
Presidency of the EU in 2010. In terms of national interest it is not evident that Spain has 
much to gain from future enlargements; in fact, as a major beneficiary of the EU’s 
expenditure for agriculture and cohesion policy, it will face competing demands from new 
members. But it is widely understood –and appreciated– that Spain’s attitude to 
enlargement has traditionally been positive, and in any case it is expected during its 
Presidency to pursue the European interest, rather than national concerns. 
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In the enlargement process the EU is now dealing with prospective members –Turkey, the 
countries of the Western Balkans and Iceland– whose situation and prospects are very 
different. 
 
Turkey 
Turkey’s application is the most difficult that the EU has ever faced. With a population of 
78 million, expected to grow to 90 million, it is the biggest country to apply for 
membership, while on the EU side several member states have reservations about ever 
accepting it as a member. As already mentioned, the Cyprus question is also a cause for 
dispute. All these problems put a question-mark over Turkey’s bid for EU membership. 
Although accession negotiations began in 2005, they are expected to continue for many 
years, and their conclusion is not assured. Some argue that, even if Turkey does not 
become a member, both it and the EU have a common interest in continuing its 
modernisation and ‘Europeanisaton’ –in other words, the accession process is positive 
even if it does not lead to a successful conclusion–. But in such a situation of ambiguity, 
the leverage of EU accession is much less effective in driving reforms in Turkey. 
 
The best outcome that can be expected in the short term, therefore, is the continuation of 
the accession negotiations, with the opening perhaps of some new chapters. Spain’s plan 
to open as many as four chapters is unlikely to be realised, but the prospect at present –
taking account also of the recent resumption of talks between the Greek and Turkish 
communities in Cyprus– seems favourable for the EU to succeed in its minimal objective 
of avoiding a diplomatic crisis with Turkey, or the abandonment by Turkey of the reform 
process. 
 
The Western Balkans 
The countries of this region, which have been geographically surrounded by the EU since 
the accession of Bulgaria and Rumania, received a promise of membership at the EU 
summit at Thessaloniki in 2003. The countries concerned are Croatia, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo (although Kosovo is 
not yet recognised as a state by several EU members, including Spain, it shares the 
region’s prospect of EU membership). With a total population of about 25 million, they do 
not present a significant problem for the EU, but although they have embarked on the 
political and economic reforms necessary for accession their progress has been 
disappointing. 
 
For the EU, the Western Balkans pose the biggest test yet of its transformative power. 
Can it use the leverage of membership as successfully as it did for the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe? The Western Balkans have begun the accession process 
from a different starting-point. The post-conflict situation, with ancient rivalries and fears 
lying just below the surface, has made their economic reconstruction and political 
reconciliation difficult. The countries of the region have a difficult historical legacy to 
overcome. Coupled with problems of bad governance, corruption and criminality, they 
suffer from a syndrome of political dependency, in which solutions are expected to come 
from outside. Bosnia and Kosovo are not even autonomous, but effectively protectorates 
under the tutelage of the international community. 
 
Nevertheless, with the Western Balkan countries the question is not whether they will join 
the EU, but when. The fact that Slovenia (like them, once part of Yugoslavia) is a member 
of the EU shows that they too can make the grade. But it will take a long time, and it 
would be unwise to predict the dates at which they will actually join. The EU’s 
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enlargement policy has not yet eliminated the risk of political instability or local conflict in 
the region, and as regards their preparation for accession much remains to be completed. 
After the experience of the premature accession of Bulgaria and Rumania, the EU is now 
more cautious. In the conduct of accession negotiations, for example, it links the opening 
of chapters to the achievement by the applicant country of specific ‘benchmarks’. 
 
The countries of the Western Balkans are at different stages of the pre-accession 
process. Croatia opened negotiations in 2005, but they have progressed slowly partly 
because of Croatia’s bilateral dispute with Slovenia over maritime limits, which halted 
negotiations in 2009. Now that has been resolved, there is a better prospect of progress, 
and under Spain’s Presidency it should be possible to close a significant number of 
chapters, giving a prospect for concluding negotiations by the end of 2010 and signing an 
accession treaty in 2011. 
 
Macedonia applied for membership in 2004 and was formally accepted by the EU as a 
candidate in 2006, but the continuing dispute with Greece over its official name (the 
country is known internationally as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) prevents 
the opening of accession negotiations. Although it is not the role of Spain during its 
Presidency to intervene or mediate in such a bilateral dispute, it should apply all 
diplomatic means available to solve this problem, which is increasingly a source of 
embarrassment for the EU and of de-motivation for Macedonia. 
 
It is true that bilateral problems have delayed the enlargement process in the past –in the 
case of Slovenia, for example, Italy insisted on a solution to problems related to the 
restitution of property–. But if this kind of dispute develops into a ‘blackmail’ situation, and 
the applicant country is discouraged from making progress with necessary reforms, it 
begins to undermine the credibility of the EU’s enlargement policy. 
 
Concerning Albania and Serbia, Spain should ensure that during its Presidency the 
Council requests the Commission to make its Opinion on their applications, and for 
Montenegro it is possible that the Commission may present its Opinion. 
 
The decision of the Council in November 2009 to grant visa liberalisation to Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia has created a better political climate for the pursuit of reforms in 
the region. However, Bosnia is now lagging behind, with continuing friction and disputes 
between the ethnic communities and lack of cooperation with the war crimes tribunal in 
The Hague. Meanwhile Kosovo, while its status remains disputed, is under the guidance 
of a European Union Rule of Law Mission. 
 
In conclusion, in the case of the countries of the Western Balkans Spain is not expected 
to achieve a major breakthrough in enlargement policy, but to maintain stability and 
progress in the preparations for membership by the countries concerned. Although the 
international community is still involved in the region, the EU is now considered 
responsible for it, and the incentive of EU membership is the main instrument for driving 
reforms. If the EU cannot deal successfully with local problems here in this part of Europe, 
how can it expect to play a role as a global actor? 
 
Iceland 
Following its financial and economic crisis, Iceland sought shelter by applying for EU 
membership in 2009. With its historic democracy, its developed economy and its 
membership of the European Economic Area and the Schengen zone, Iceland fulfils all 
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the criteria for EU membership. As a small country (with a population of 0.3 million it 
would be the smallest EU member) it should pose few problems for the EU, although 
Iceland is reluctant to accept the common fisheries policy. Since public opinion in Iceland 
is divided, the result of its future referendum on EU membership is unsure. Problems with 
the UK and the Netherlands concerning the reimbursement of deposits in Icelandic banks 
could also be a disturbing factor in public opinion. 
 
During the first half of 2010 the European Commission is due to present its Opinion on 
Iceland’s application, and before the end of its Presidency Spain may be able to proceed 
to the formal opening of accession negotiations. 
 
Enlargement Fatigue: What Kind of Problem? 
Enlargement policy is presently conducted against a rather negative political background: 
EU governments have not considered it as a priority field in recent years, and sometimes 
the European Commission has seemed to be its only advocate. The phenomenon of 
‘enlargement fatigue’ is often mentioned. 
 
The arrival of 12 new members was an event that naturally took some time for politicians 
and the public to absorb, but after five years without major problems resulting from it one 
could expect that by now the enlargement would be largely accepted. Of course the EU 
has experienced many problems in the last five years; although some of the economic 
difficulties can be traced to enlargement (typically the relocation of jobs to new member 
states) it is often equated with more general problems of foreign competition and 
globalisation. 
 
In the political field the recurring difficulty at the EU level during this period was ratification 
of the Constitutional Treaty and then the Lisbon Treaty. In effect the EU has been 
suffering from ‘Treaty fatigue’. The present macroeconomic situation does not provide a 
positive climate for enlargement –it is always easier to accept new members at a time of 
economic growth– but it should nevertheless be possible for the EU to pursue its 
enlargement policy now in a more serene manner. 
 
Conclusion: In the period from 1995 to 2007 the EU more than doubled the number of its 
members and increased its population by one-third: it can never again experience such a 
large expansion, and in coming years will expand more slowly. The problem of 
‘enlargement fatigue’ which followed the last expansion is now less problematic, and the 
EU’s enlargement policy should proceed in a way that respects the appropriate criteria for 
its success. What counts is not the speed of the process but: 
 
• In the pre-accession period, the enhancement of security, stability and prosperity. 
• After accession, the harmonious integration of new members, without disruption of 
existing members or the functioning of the EU’s institutions and policies, and the 
satisfactory continuation of the EU’s development. 
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Under its Presidency of the EU Spain is not expected to achieve a major breakthrough in 
the field of enlargement, but to ensure that steady progress is made in preparations for 
membership by the countries concerned. In the case of Turkey the basic aim is to 
continue the accession negotiations, avoiding the risk of derailment by the Cyprus 
problem, while for Iceland the question will be whether to open accession negotiations. In 
the Western Balkan countries, where many problems of governance need to be resolved 
before membership is possible, and there are still risks of instability, the role of the EU is 
of prime importance and the prospect of EU membership should be exploited intelligently 
to drive reform. 
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